In the first place> the foreword has a highly polished quality> making it unlikely that it
In that work we established grounds for the claim that some objects, such as classes and numbers, are merely logical constructions. That is, the November 1924 BERTRAND RUSSELL sidered it better to leave the book as I wrote it in 1911, adding only these introductory remarks about the further investigations which suggest its imperfections. symbols which stand for such objects have no meaning in themselves; rather their use is merely indicated. We can define the meaning of a sentence [Behauptung] in which such symbols occur, but that meaning [Bedeutung] does not contain any constitutent corresponding to these symbols. We were thus led to a new use of the principle known as Occam's Razor, which states that the number of entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. Whitehead convinced me that "matter" is a logical fiction, that is, a piece of matter can be constructed as a system of connected events in various parts of the space-time continuum. There are various methods one can use to carry this through -the choice between them has been very difficult up to now. Whitehead gave one way in his Principles of NatUX'al Knowledge and in his Concept of Natu1"e; another way is presented in my book, Our Knowledge of the Exte1"nal w01"ld. According to these presentations, the discussi.on of matter in Chapters II and III should be changed, although not so completely as might appear.
The same method and the same principle have led me to adopt a further change in my views. In the discussion of knowledge in The P1"oblems of Philosophy I assumed the existence of the subject and treated acquaintance as a relation between the subject and the object. Now I also consider the subject to be a logical construction. The result is that one must give up the distinction between sensations and sense-data; on this question I now agree with William James and the school of American realists. The changes following from this which have affected my theory of knowledge are to be found in my Analysis of Mind.
At the time when The P1"oblems of Philosophy was written the general theory of relativity was not yet known, and I had not yet sufficiently real ized the importance of the special theory. I would have chosen some other examples, had I been considering the theory of relativity. But the problems dealt with in this book are, in large part, totally independent of that theory and are on the whole not decisively influenced by it. If I were writing the book now, I would be much less inclined to view some ethical statements as a prio1"i. I could have said more about induction had I been able to utilize Mr. Keynes's T1"eatise on P1"obability, which has since been published.
I found it impossible to make these changes in the text because the above-mentioned views are closely related to the logical calculus
[Logikkalkul] and can scarcely be presented so as to be generally understood. It is easier to understand them as changes in previously presented theories than if they are explained alone. I have therefore con-
